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Protecting Mortgage Borrowers from Coerced Representation by
a Lender's Attorney: New Jersey's Attempt May Fall Short Once
Again
by Cornelius R. O'Brien
Cornelius R. O'Brien, an attorney and
certified public accountant, is a member of
the Financial Services Department of the
law firm Blank, Rome, Comisky &
McCauley. His practice concentrates in
the areas of consumer financial services,
residential mortgage lending, bankruptcy,
and commercial lending. The firm has
offices in New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Florida.
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 29, 1993, the New Jer-
sey Legislature took a significant step
toward protecting mortgage borrow-
ers from being coerced into paying a
mortgage lender's legal fees when it
amended the "Closed Shop Statute."'
This amendment, also known as the
Attorney Disclosure and Fee Limita-
tion Statute, took effect upon passage.
Previously, borrowers in New Jersey
were often forced not only to rely
upon the legal advice of attorneys hired
by lenders when finalizing loan trans-
actions, but also to reimburse lenders
for attorneys' fees charged for review-
ing documents related to the transac-
tion.
The 1993 amendment to the Closed
Shop Statute was designed in part to
protect a borrower's right to be repre-
sented by legal counsel of the
borrower's choice in mortgage loan
transactions. The amendment also
placed explicit restrictions on a mort-
gage lender's ability to seek reim-
bursement from a borrower for legal
fees incurred in mortgage transactions
secured by New Jersey real estate. 2
By enacting the amendment after
nearly two decades of legislative de-
bate, the New Jersey Legislature in-
tended to curb the practice of requir-
ing borrowers to use counsel selected
by the lender and the payment of un-
necessary or unreasonable legal fees
in connection with mortgage loan
transactions. However, whether the
legislature's intent will be carried out
is a question still left unanswered.
II. HISTORY OF THE CLOSED
SHOP STATUTE
The Closed Shop Statute was first
enacted in 1975. The statute origi-
nally barred mortgage lenders from
requiring borrowers to use attorneys
chosen by the lenders in mortgage
transactions involving loans on one to
four family residences, which would
be occupied by the borrower or mem-
bers of her immediate family.3
Prior to passage of the Closed Shop
Statute, the approved-attorney require-
ment was commonly relied upon by
most residential mortgage lenders.'
The attorneys involved in such trans-
actions were referred to as "approved
attorneys," and borrowers were fre-
quently permitted only to close the
mortgage loan transaction with the
help of these lender-approved attor-
neys.
The use of approved attorneys had
the ultimate effect of providing attor-
neys who specialized in mortgage clos-
ings with a steady stream of business
as well as providing lenders with a
reliable referral source for new mort-
gage business. While this practice
was lucrative for lenders and their
approved attorneys, it often cost bor-
rowers unnecessary fees for the re-
By enacting the
amendment after nearly
two decades of legislative
debate, the New Jersey
Legislature intended to
curb the practice of
requiring borrowers to
use counsel selected by
the lender and the
payment of unnecessary
or unreasonable legal fees
in connection with
mortgage loan
transactions.
Volume 6 Number 3 / Spring 1994 77
view and processing of loan docu-
ments and deprived borrowers of in-
dependent legal representation.
The approved-attorney arrange-
ment in New Jersey invariably en-
couraged lenders and their approved
attorneys to refer business to each
other.' It also raised profound ques-
tions among members of the bar re-
garding a possible conflict of interest
between the attorneys' loyalties to the
borrower and the lender. In many
cases, it was unclear to the borrower
whether the attorney represented the
lender, the borrower, or both.6
Although the practice of approved
attorneys holds enormous potential
for abuse, its original purpose was
sound. Initially, the process of using
approved attorneys was designed to
ensure that a mortgage loan would be
properly closed and the proceeds cor-
rectly disbursed according to the
lender's closing instructions. The use
of an attorney who knew the lender's
requirements was considered the most
convenient way to achieve this practi-
cal goal.
The practice of using approved at-
torneys has never quite reached that
high mark, however. Despite the ap-
proved-attorney scheme, many lend-
ers frequently face situations in which
closing attorneys or title agents do not
fully comply with the lender's closing
instructions. For instance, a national
residential mortgage lender confided
to the author of this article that her
company has recently experienced un-
authorized deviations from the
lender's instructions in the majority
of closings by unapproved attorneys
or title agents involved in residential
mortgage loan transactions. These
deviations usually relate to the failure
to properly comply with the consumer
disclosure requirements of the federal
Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act 7 and the implementing regulations
contained in federal regulation X.8
Although the original Closed Shop
Statute required residential mortgage
lenders to give borrowers unfettered
discretion in selecting an attorney to
represent the borrower's interest, the
Despite the approved-
attorney scheme, many
lenders frequently face
situations in which
closing attorneys or
title agents do not fully
comply with the
lender's closing
instructions.
statute also provided that it:
shall not preclude a lender from
requiring that documents pre-
pared in connection with a mort-
gage loan transaction prepared
by a borrower's attorney to be
submitted to the lender's attor-
ney for examination and review
and to require the borrower to
pay a reasonable fee ... for such
service by the lender's attorney
... [and that] the lender shall
provide the borrower, at the time
a loan commitment is made, a
written statement covering the
basis of the review fee.9
This linguistic ambiguity appar-
ently gave rise to the current approved-
attorney schemes and revolving fee
schedules. After enactment of the
Closed Shop Statute in 1975, a com-
mon practice of circumventing the
statute's intent evolved. Under this
informal practice, lenders and their
attorneys began requiring borrowers
to pay review fees to lenders' attor-
neys for the examination of papers
already prepared by the borrowers'
attorneys. 0
This circular fee schedule eventu-
ally led to a comprehensive inquiry by
the New Jersey State Bar Association
regarding the ethical practices of mort-
gage lenders and the use of approved
attorneys in mortgage transactions. As
a result, the New Jersey Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Professional
Ethics issued Opinion 398 in 1978, in
which the Committee stated that:
Our Legislature has determined
that where a loan is to be se-
cured by a mortgage on a one to
four family residence to be re-
sided in by the individual bor-
rower or a member of his fam-
ily, the borrower shall have the
right to be represented in the
mortgage transaction by an at-
torney-at-law of New Jersey of
his own selection. While this
Committee has no jurisdiction
over a lending institution which
may choose to disregard the pro-
visions of the law, it is our opin-
ion that any attorney who aids or
participates in a course of con-
duct which is designed to sub-
vert the provisions of the "Closed
Shop" statute to the end that
borrowers are deprived of their
right to independent counsel in
residential mortgage transac-
tions of the type above referred
to is guilty of unethical con-
duct."
Subsequently, the Closed Shop
Statute was amended to include the
Advisory Committee's recommenda-
tions, which expanded the scope of
the statute's coverage to include not
only residential mortgage loans on one
to four family dwellings, but on all
mortgage loans secured by real estate,
including commercial and business
loans. 2 The 1978 amendment also
attempted to define more narrowly the
legal fees that a lender could charge a
borrower when the lender's attorney
reviewed loan documents already pre-
pared by the borrower's attorney. 3
This circular fee
schedule eventually led
to a comprehensive
inquiry by the New
Jersey State Bar
Association regarding
the ethical practices of
mortgage lenders and
the use of approved
attorneys in mortgage
transactions.
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The amendment provided that the
lender could:
require the borrower to pay a
reasonable fee as defined by the
Disciplinary Rules of the Code
of Professional Responsibility
adopted by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court for ... [document
review] by the lender's attor-
ney, provided, however, that the
lender shall provide the bor-
rower, at the time a loan com-
mitment is made, a written state-
ment covering the basis of this
review fee.'
Despite the issuance of Opinion 398
and the subsequent 1978 amendment
to the Closed Shop Statute, many lend-
ers and their attorneys continued to do
business as usual. Lenders continued
to select attorneys to represent them in
mortgage loan closings. By contrast,
borrowers entering these transactions
frequently were not represented by
independent counsel. Although bor-
rowers had not selected the attorneys
involved in these transactions or even
been given a chance to veto the attor-
neys' participation, borrowers were
still often required to reimburse lend-
ers for legal expenses incurred for
review of documents by the lenders'
attorneys. 5
This continued practice ultimately
led to a second ethics inquiry, and in
1987, the New Jersey Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Professional
Ethics issued Opinion 608.16
II. OPINION 608
Although the debate over the use of
lender-approved attorneys had raged
for nearly ten years, the catalyst which
eventually led to the issuance of Opin-
ion 608 came in 1987 from a single
New Jersey attorney,' 7 who simply
asked the Advisory Committee
whether the following situation vio-
lated the Rules of Professional Con-
duct:
[An] attorney for a lending in-
stitution representing it in a
mortgage loan transaction pro-
Although borrowers had
not selected the attorneys
involved in these
transactions or even been
given a chance to veto the
attorneys' participation,
borrowers were still often
required to reimburse
lenders for legal expenses
incurred for review of
documents by the
lenders' attorneys.
poses to perform the title search,
provide for insuring the title and
presumably prepare the note,
mortgage, and other closing pa-
pers. The attorney will bill the
lender for such services. The
lender, in turn, will bill the bor-
rower for that work and advise
the borrower that the attorney
will close the mortgage loan at
the attorney's offices and that
the borrower may secure his own
attorney to represent him if he
chooses.'8
The Advisory Committee deter-
mined that the approved-attorney
scheme violated the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. The Advisory Com-
mittee regarded "the proposed plan as
a scheme to avoid the provisions of ...
[the Closed Shop Statute], which pro-
hibit a lending institution from requir-
ing a borrower of a loan secured by a
mortgage to employ the services of
the lender's counsel or an attorney
specified by the lender." The Advi-
sory Committee then referred the in-
quirer to Opinion 398, in which the
committee stated that any attorney
who aids a lender in defeating the
purposes of the Closed Shop Statute is
engaging in unethical conduct."
In a notice to the New Jersey Bar
accompanying the supplement to
Opinion 608, the Advisory Commit-
tee referred back to its earlier position
in Opinion 608, stating that it was
"improper for an attorney represent-
ing a lending institution to prepare
papers incident to a mortgage loan
transaction and bill the lender for such
services, where the lender will pass
the costs on to the borrower for the
work."2 0
Following the publication of Opin-
ion 608, however, the Advisory Com-
mittee received dozens of requests for
reconsideration." The committee
agreed to reconsider Opinion 608 and
held the opinion in "abeyance" during
an eighteen-month period of recon-
sideration. After soliciting comments
from members of the New Jersey Bar
Association, the Advisory Committee
issued a supplement to Opinion 608
on June 1, 1989.22 The supplement
quoted thirty-three excerpts of corre-
spondence from members of the Bar
received regarding Opinion 608.23 The
comments generally criticized vari-
ous ambiguities in the language of the
Closed Shop Statute and the Advisory
Committee's earlier interpretation of
the statute. 24
In the supplement to Opinion 608,
the Advisory Committee stood firm
on the position articulated in Opinion
608. The committee also declined to
comment on criticisms raised by mem-
bers of the New Jersey Bar regarding
the opinion. 25 The Advisory Commit-
tee concluded the debate by stating
"that any dissatisfaction with the
[Closed Shop Statute] ... will have to
be resolved by resort to the Legisla-
ture and any questions regarding its
interpretation by resort to our Supreme
Court.
26
Appeals to the New Jersey Supreme
Court quickly followed the
committee's decision, but they lan-
guished before the court during nearly
four years of indecision. 27
Then, on January 29, 1993, the New
Jersey Legislature spoke again when
it passed the amendment to the Closed
Shop Statute. 2 The Advisory Com-
mittee immediately reported to the
supreme court that it believed the
amendment "superseded" Opinion
608.29 Relying largely on the Advi-
sory Committee's conclusion that the
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amendment superseded Opinion 608,
the supreme court held that all appeals
pending before it at the time concern-
ing Opinion 608 were now moot.3 0
Then on March 12, 1993, at the direc-
tion of the court, the Advisory Com-
mittee published a formal notice to
the bar advising that Opinion 608 had
been superseded by the amendment.31
Although many individuals thought
the amendment would be a legislative
solution to the ongoing controversy
regarding the Closed Shop Statute 2
and the practice of circular attorneys'
fees, the amendment may simply have
set the stage for a new round of con-
troversy regarding a lender's right to
seek reimbursement from borrowers
for the lender's legal expenses.
IV. THE 1993 AMENDMENT: THE
ATTORNEY DISCLOSURE AND
FEE LIMITATION STATUTE
The 1993 amendment, also known
as the Attorney Disclosure and Fee
Limitation Statute, provides that any
"banking institution, other financial
institution or other lender, which is
licensed or authorized under the laws
of this State or of the United States to
engage in the business of making loans
... or which has an office in this State
for that purpose"33 must comply with
the requirements of the statute.34
Although this definition appears to
spell out who must comply with the
statute and would appear to include all
lenders making loans in New Jersey,
the definition may be construed to
exclude those lenders who make loans
in New Jersey but whose offices are
outside of the state.
The Attorney Disclosure and Fee
Limitation Statute requires lenders
who issue mortgage loans secured by
either commercial or residential real
estate in New Jersey to make certain
disclosures regarding the use of an
attorney and the borrower's obliga-
tion to reimburse the lender for attor-
neys' fees.35 In addition, the statute
prohibits any lender from requiring a
borrower to employ the services of the
lender's counsel or an attorney chosen
The reality in most New
Jersey consumer
mortgage loan
transactions, however,
is that the lender
prepares the loan
documents. The
consumer has little or
no leverage to
negotiate changes in
the documents and
must agree to them or
reject the loan.
by the lender in connection with a loan
secured by real estate or personal prop-
erty located in New Jersey. 6 Other
provisions of the statute, which are
not addressed in this article, also ap-
ply to loans secured by personal prop-
erty and unsecured loans. 37
V. ATTORNEY FEE DISCLOSURE
FOR COMMERCIAL LOANS
SECURED BY NEW JERSEY
REAL ESTATE 38
For commercial loans3 9 secured by
New Jersey real estate, a lender is now
required under the 1993 statute to give
a residential borrower two different
disclosures. First, prior to a borrower's
acceptance of a written loan commit-
ment, the lender must advise the bor-
rower in writing that: (1) the interests
of the borrower and the lender are or
may be different and may conflict; (2)
the lender's attorney represents only
the lender; and (3) the borrower is
advised to employ a New Jersey li-
censed attorney of the borrower's
choice 40 (herein referred to as a "right
to counsel notice").
Second, the lender must disclose in
writing as part of a written-loan com-
mitment (or within ten days of the
issuance of a written-loan commit-
ment): (1) the basis for calculating
any lender's attorneys' fees for which
the borrower will be required to reim-
burse the lender, and (2) a "good faith
estimate" of the lender's attorneys'
fees (good faith estimate). 41 If the
good faith estimate of legal charges
will be "materially exceeded," the
lender must notify the borrower at the
time the lender becomes aware of the
increase.42 However, the statute does
not define the meaning of the term
"materially exceeded," which is likely
to prove troublesome in the future.
Failure to advise a borrower that
the good faith estimate will be ex-
ceeded will preclude the lender from
seeking reimbursement for attorneys'
fees in excess of the estimate. How-
ever, the failure of the lender to give
the borrower a good faith estimate
initially or to advise the borrower of
any increase in the estimate will not
affect the validity or enforceability of
the loan commitment, the loan, or the
security for the loan. 43
The 1993 statute requires lenders
to give the right to counsel notice and
to offer a good faith estimate "if a
lender makes a written offer to a bor-
rower to make a loan secured by real
property located in ... [New Jer-
sey] .... I But, what if a lender agrees
to make a loan without issuing a writ-
ten commitment? A genuine issue
requiring a legal determination may
arise because the statute is silent on
which disclosures are expressly re-
quired where no written-loan com-
mitment has been issued by a lender.
Although this
definition appears to
spell out who must
comply with the
statute and would
appear to include all
lenders making loans
in New Jersey, the
definition may be
construed to exclude
those lenders who
make loans in New
Jersey but whose
offices are outside of
the state.
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Although the statute literally demands
disclosure only where a written-loan
commitment is issued, prudent lend-
ers are offering disclosures even where
no written loan commitment is issued.
VI. ATTORNEY FEE DISCLOSURE
FOR CONSUMER LOANS
SECURED BY NEW JERSEY
REAL ESTATE45
As with commercial loans secured
on New Jersey real estate, a lender
must give a borrower, in a consumer
loan46 transaction secured by a resi-
dential first mortgage 47 on New Jer-
sey real estate, a right to counsel no-
tice and a good faith estimate if a
written loan commitment is issued.4 8
However, for consumer mortgage loan
transactions, a lender can only seek
reimbursement for attorneys' fees for
the review of loan documents pre-
pared or submitted by the borrower
(or the borrower's attorney) or in cases
where the borrower (or borrower's
attorney) requests the lender's attor-
ney to undertake additional work to
further the closing of the transaction. 9
The reality in most New Jersey
consumer mortgage loan transactions,
however, is that the lender prepares
the loan documents. The consumer
has little or no leverage to negotiate
changes in the documents and must
agree to them or reject the loan. More-
over, the New Jersey Mortgage Pro-
cessing Regulations 0 specifically pro-
hibit a lender from seeking reimburse-
ment from a borrower for document
preparation and processing fees on
most residential first mortgage loans.5'
However, the Attorney Disclosure
and Fee Limitation Statute defines
"loan documents" to mean "a promis-
sory note, loan agreement, mortgage,
affidavit of title, power of attorney,
survey and survey affidavit, title docu-
ments and searches and commitments
for title insurance and modification of
any promissory note, mortgage or loan
agreement."52 Because the definition
of "loan documents" can include docu-
ments that are ordinarily submitted by
third parties to the lender on behalf of
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the borrower (i.e., survey and title
documents), it is unclear whether a
lender may seek reimbursement un-
der the statute from a borrower for the
portion of the lender's attorney's fee
that can be attributed to the attorney's
review of survey and title documents.
VII. RESIDENTIAL SECOND
MORTGAGE LOAN
EXCEPTION 5 3
Residential mortgage loans origi-
nated under the New Jersey Second-
ary Mortgage Loan Act 54 and similar
secondary mortgage loans55 are not
subject to the Attorney Disclosure and
Fee Limitation Statute. 56 Although the
Secondary Mortgage Loan Act has its
own provisions relating to the disclo-
sure and imposition of legal fees on
borrowers,57 many second or subordi-
nate lien mortgage lenders, such as
national and state chartered banks and
savings banks, are exempt from the
coverage of the Secondary Mortgage
Loan Act.58
VIII. GENERAL ATTORNEY FEE
RESTRICTIONS 59
The Attorney Disclosure and Fee
Limitation Statute does not permit at-
torneys' fees or other charges which
are otherwise limited by other appli-
cable laws. 60 Additionally, if a bor-
rower is required to reimburse a lender
for any portion of the lender's
attorney's fees or expenses, all such
fees and expenses must be reasonable
as defined by the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct adopted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. 6'
IX. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Although the Attorney Disclosure
and Fee Limitation Statute has super-
seded Opinion 608, it has also raised a
number of new questions, such as:
Which lenders are covered by the stat-
ute? What should a lender do where
no written-loan commitment is issued
by the lender? Precisely what legal
fees now can be reimbursed in a con-
sumer mortgage loan transaction?
Despite nearly 20 years
of legislation, litigation,
and advisory opinions,
the Closed Shop
Statute and its
amendments still have
not conclusively
foreclosed all the
loopholes in the
approved-attorney
practice and the
practice by lenders of
imposing a charge on
residential mortgage
borrowers for the
lender's legal
expenses.
What does the term "materially ex-
ceeded" mean?
How will these and other questions
concerning the statute be answered?
As the Advisory Committee stated
when it issued the supplement to Opin-
ion 608, "[t]he position of our Com-
mittee is that any dissatisfaction with
the statute will have to be resolved by
resort to the Legislature and any ques-
tions regarding its interpretation by
resort to our Supreme Court."62 So
continues the saga of Opinion 608.
X. CONCLUSION
Despite nearly 20 years of legisla-
tion, litigation, and advisory opinions,
the Closed Shop Statute and its amend-
ments still have not conclusively fore-
closed all the loopholes in the ap-
proved-attorney practice and the prac-
tice by lenders of imposing a charge
on residential mortgage borrowers for
the lender's legal expenses. The mere
fact that lenders impose a separate
legal fee on unsophisticated residen-
tial mortgage borrowers has a chilling
effect on a borrower paying for inde-
pendent legal counsel to represent the
borrower, in what is probably one of
the most significant financial transac-
tions a consumer may face in a life-
time. .
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